Month: December 2022

Local Peacebuilding Expert, Landry Ninteretse, argues that sustainable peace in the Great Lakes region can only be achieved with the real and effective involvement of local peacebuilders, who must be supported accordingly.

As soon as new clashes between the Congolese army and M23 fighters broke out in Eastern DRC, the government pointed the finger at Rwanda, accusing the country of supporting the rebels. These accusations have always been denied by Rwanda and have led first Angola and then the East African Community (EAC) to initiate urgent mediation.

Fearing a new escalation of regional violence, the seven member states of the EAC agreed in April to deploy a regional force in Eastern DRC. In mid-August, a first contingent of Burundian soldiers under Congolese command was deployed in South Kivu, followed by another Kenyan contingent of 900 soldiers who arrived in Goma on 13 November.

Eventually, the sub-regional force will bring together between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers with the aim of ’containing, defeating and eradicating negative forces’ operating in the four provinces of Eastern DRC – namely North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Haut-Uele. It will join the 1,700 Ugandan troops deployed since November 2021 to hunt down the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), whose results remain mixed one year later.

Ineffective military approaches

While some see this deployment as a glimmer of hope for ending the violence that has long plagued Eastern DRC, many remain sceptical. This is not the first time that foreign forces have intervened on Congolese soil.

All the new troops come in addition to the 14,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO), which has been present since 2000 but has not yet succeeded in restoring peace.

The failure of the military approach can be explained in part by the fact that such missions do not address the root causes of land, identity and community conflicts. Nor do they sufficiently involve the local population in the push for peace.

As long as local people are not at the centre of peacebuilding processes, the sustainability and above all the ownership of the peace will remain transient.

The centrality of civil society in addressing recurrent conflicts

Indeed, it is the local population, more specifically local peacebuilders, who must be at the heart of any action to restore regional security, peace and social cohesion. Unfortunately, these actors do not have sufficient means and capacities to accomplish this noble task.

Today, investing in such initiatives provides excellent opportunities to work with actors at the heart of the conflict. They understand the conflict’s context and dynamics better than others. And they can provide a rapid and flexible response to resolve conflicts, save lives, and ease tensions until diplomatic efforts and high-level negotiations are completed.

Strengthening local governance and supporting the efforts of local peacebuilding actors in the Great Lakes region, whose strengths are no longer in question, should be the number one priority – not only of the governments concerned, but also of the UN and other international organisations concerned about the recurrent insecurity and instability.

Peace actors at work

Despite the hostile security context and the risks involved, civil society organisations working in the field of peacebuilding are not sitting idly by. For example, the SPR Grands-Lacs (Synergy of Women for Peace and Reconciliation of the Great Lakes of Africa), carries out awareness-raising and capacity-building activities through the Women, Peace and Security programme called "MANU: Mwanamuke Amani na Usalama" in Swahili. It also supports advocacy and lobbying of duty-bearers on peace, the participation of women in conflict resolution and decision-making bodies, and the protection of human rights defenders.

Bénévolat pour l'Enfance and AIDPROFEN, for their part, jointly strengthen the capacities of community governance structures set up in the city of Goma, the territory of Masisi, Nyiragongo and Rutshuru on the so-called "Common Ground" approach. The focus is on collaboration and dialogue as mechanisms for improving relations between communities. This approach teaches governance structures how to: prioritise collaborative and inclusive methods, develop active listening, combat inhibitors of empathy and find common ground in conflict resolution and peaceful cohabitation.

AfriYAN (African Youth and Adolescents Network) sensitises young people in Goma, Nyiragongo and Rutshuru on UN Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, calling on young people to avoid violent extremism and to promote peace and mutual tolerance.

The multiplication of foreign military interventions in eastern DRC will not solve the persistent security problem that has lasted for almost three decades. As long as the role of peacebuilders is not recognised and valued, efforts to bring about peace and resolve conflicts are likely to be in vain.

The enormous funds mobilised to deploy military missions should rather be reinvested in strengthening the action of local actors, whose effectiveness and relevance are not in question.

Source: Peace Direct

It's been more than a year since jihadis first stormed Igor Kassah's town in northern Benin, but the priest still lives in fear. His once peaceful life is now marked by threatening phone calls and extremist diatribes tacked on church doors demanding that people leave. He is haunted by the bodies he has seen of those killed in the attacks.

"We no longer have a normal life," the 41-year-old said through text messages to The Associated Press. "It's hard to talk and act confidently because you don't know who's in front of you anymore."

Violence by extremists linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group has wracked much of West Africa's inland Sahel region for more than seven years. Now it is spreading into the coastal states with Benin the hardest hit, experts say.

Jihadi attacks in Benin have spiked more than tenfold between July and December compared with the same period last year — from 2 to 25 — according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. This is more than any other coastal state in West Africa. If the extremist violence continues to spread it could have far-reaching consequences, say analysts.

"When you talk about the Sahel, geopolitical interests are limited," said Kars de Bruijne, senior research fellow with Clingendael, a Dutch-based research organization. "But it's different for coastal states, which are economically much stronger and more important to the African Union and Western countries such as England and the United States."

These Western powers might see their interests at stake, which is a key reason why they should be really concerned about the spillover of extremist violence into Benin, he said. The more fronts the jihadis open, the more difficult it will be to effectively respond, he said.

Spillover from Burkina Faso

The violence in Benin, a country of 12 million people, is largely a result of what's happening in neighboring Burkina Faso, where jihadi attacks have killed hundreds and displaced nearly 2 million people. Attacks were initially confined to the border between eastern Burkina Faso and Benin in the W and Pendjari National Parks in the Alibori and Atacora regions but are now expanding. Incidents have increased since June in populated areas around the parks with jihadis connected to the al-Qaida-linked group known as JNIM pushing Benin's military from the border, creating a security vacuum and taking control of part of the country, according to a recent report by Clingendael.

The jihadi rebels appear to be creating a large area of influence from Niger to Togo in order to keep supply lines open, recruit people and procure material, say analysts. Another aim could be to withstand pressure from the Accra Initiative, a military platform involving Burkina Faso and coastal countries to prevent the further spread of extremism from the Sahel.

Benin's government has ramped up its response, investing nearly $130 million to create new operating bases, fortify existing ones and recruit nearly 4,000 security forces since last year, Benin's President Patrice Talon said in a speech earlier this month.

But the government's increased security is bringing human rights abuses such as arbitrary arrests of those suspected of working with jihadis, particularly the ethnic Fulani who are suspected to be affiliated to extremists, locals and rights groups say.

"There is a risk that human rights violations will become systematic and worsen, as is the case in neighboring countries that have been fighting the same armed groups for several years," said Samira Daoud, regional director for West Africa for Amnesty International.

Aid groups call for social investments

West Africa's coastal states and the international community haven't learned enough from the crisis in the Sahel about how to address the insecurity, regional experts said.

"We're watching the same dynamic play out in Benin and I'm afraid that we are trying the same strategies that failed in the Sahel," said Laura Sanders, founder of Cetus Global a consulting company based in Benin and focused on conflict prevention in West Africa.

"There's an opportunity to choose a different route for littoral countries in addressing the crisis, focusing on the drivers of violence and what pushes people into these armed groups, such as unresolved grievances, social marginalization, and poor governance of natural resources," she said.

To reduce humanitarian suffering as violence increases, it's urgent to scale up investments now in education, nutrition and health in regions bordering central Sahel countries, say aid groups.

Meanwhile, communities in Benin say they are being forced to accept a life they never thought they'd have to endure.

"We thought for a moment, perhaps because of a certain naivety ... that (we) could escape the situation of threats, of near-daily attacks that (Benin) is undergoing," said Arnaud Houenou an expert in national security and a professor at Benin's University of Abomey Calavi.

"Benin has been spared the terrorist war in the Sahel despite its proximity to Nigeria and Burkina Faso," he said. "But reality has set in."

Source: Voice of America

Key Messages

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in southern Madagascar, Malawi, and Mozambique, as well as areas of Angola and Lesotho, and much of Zimbabwe, as the lean season progresses and high food prices and below-average wages limit household purchasing power. Food security outcomes are expected to be most severe in southwestern Madagascar, where humanitarian assistance is supporting Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes. The population in need is likely to increase steadily until the start of the 2023 harvest in March or April.

Timely and well-distributed rainfall across most of central and eastern southern Africa is increasing the demand for agricultural labor, particularly land preparation and planting. The effective onset of rainfall is also improving water and pasture conditions. However, in northern Mozambique and northern Madagascar, below-average rainfall is limiting planting which is expected to start in December or January. However, cumulatively average to above-average rainfall is still forecast through the 2022/23 production season. Across most of southern Africa, average crop production is anticipated as high regional prices for agricultural inputs and global supply chain disruptions are resulting in shortages and delayed deliveries, which may impact the harvest in 2023.

As the lean season progresses in most parts of the region, many poor households in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, DRC, Angola, and Lesotho are now reliant on market purchases for food. While supplies are flowing normally, domestic food prices have surged in response to declining stock-to-use ratios, increasing transport costs, high fertilizer prices, and global supply disruptions. Headline inflation levels in Mozambique are declining but remain above pre-pandemic levels, while in Malawi, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and the DRC, food and transport inflation levels are continuing to rise. In the last quarter of 2022, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Lesotho tightened monetary policy to control inflation, leading to increased costs of servicing debts and cutbacks in public sector spending for agricultural support programs.

Conflict continues to disrupt livelihood activities in areas of DRC and northern Mozambique, driving Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in affected areas. In the DRC, the M23 crisis in the territory of Rutshuru has disrupted the area's supply chain for imported and local products, increasing prices by 10-67 percent over the last three months. As of December 13, humanitarian partners estimate that around 510,000 people have been displaced by the conflict since March 2022, with nearly half in Nyiragongo territory. In Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, sporadic attacks by insurgents continue to prevent households from settling or fully engaging in typical economic activities. The IOM reported around 38,000 people were on the move in November, with attacks and fear of attacks being the primary driver for movement. Most IDPs remain reliant on humanitarian assistance to fill food consumption gaps.

Source: Famine Early Warning System Network